Op-ed attempt
Exams are upon me, and thus the paucity of posts of late. I am posting an attempt at an op-ed, which I have circulated to a few papers, but without success so far:
Pakistan, a Pluralist Democracy?
Pakistan's descent into civil chaos and yet another crisis of leadership has forced many American officials to reconsider their unwavering support of a country that has allowed Islamist violence to flourish even as it reassures its Western allies that it remains a central bulwark in the fight against terrorism. It is easy to forget, however, that once upon a time Pakistan was a secular democracy that sought to protect minority rights, even as it maintained a Muslim majority – a reality at odds with the repression of judges, lawyers, and opposition parties that defines the nation today.
What's more, it wasn't the presence of Christians or Jews that encouraged Pakistan's eventual slide into sectarian strife and intolerance. It was a campaign of legalized exclusion directed against a pacifist strain of Islam. That conflict formed part of these religious extremists' ultimate goal of controlling Pakistan and, from there, launching a global Islamic revolution. It is crucial to understand the history of Pakistan over the past several decades, for it illustrates how intolerance toward a single Muslim community eventually formed the ideological underpinnings of a worldwide jihadist movement that threatens the livelihood and stability of people of all religions.
While Pakistan is often regarded as having been founded as an "Islamic state," the nation's founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, articulated a strikingly different vision: "You may belong to any religion or caste or creed -- that has nothing to do with the business of the State." This secular credo reflected a vision of Pakistan as a Muslim democracy, a country where Muslims would form a majority but all citizens would have equal rights and the laws would reflect the sovereign will of the people, not the dictates of any particular faith. This was anathema to the radical Islamists, whose most prominent leader, Maulana Mawdudi, formed the Jamat-e-Islami, an organization with the stated aim of establishing the "sovereignty of Allah" in Pakistan by imposing sharia law and subordinating non-Muslims to Muslims. The ultimate goal was to take over not only Pakistan, but to destroy all non-Islamic states by means of a violent revolution.
The successful implementation of an Islamic state requires the silencing of dissenting voices. By this reasoning, anyone who disagrees with the use of political violence to establish an Islamic state does not belong in the fold of Islam. Thus, the Jamat-e-Islami launched a bloody campaign of violence against Ahmadi Muslims, a group that renounces all forms of religious violence and espouses a secular form of government. Never before had a group been legally excluded from the Muslim community. My father, an Ahmadi who was a medical student in Pakistan at the time, vividly recalls the climate of fear whipped up by the Jamat-e-Islami's activists. Fleeing for his life, he narrowly escaped the fates of thousands of others who have been brutally murdered by the radical Islamists. The ultimate result of this campaign was a constitutional amendment that declares Ahmadis non-Muslims. This new development had an effect far beyond the Ahmadi community, as it legitimated intra-Muslim strife, leading directly to the vicious sectarian carnage that is still ongoing. Today, Pakistan is not so much a country of Muslims but a hodgepodge of up to 72 sects, each convinced of their exclusive claim to Muslim identity. Confessional affiliation has become the centerpiece of personal identity, leading to the balkinization of Pakistani politics and society along religious lines.
The zenith of the Jamat-e-Islami's influence came during the years of Zia-ul-Haq, a military dictator who brought about the Islamization of Pakistan. Under his rule, the Jamat-e-Islami was able to impose a medieval form of sharia law that is still in effect today. As a result, women's and minority rights were severely curtailed. Rape became almost impossible to prove, and Christians and others faced capital punishment for suspicions of insulting the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). Those who stood up for minority rights were killed or imprisoned, a practice that continues today under the rule of General Musharraf.
Having enjoyed such success in implementing its domestic agenda, the Jamat-e-Islami was emboldened to infiltrate the army and the intelligence services in order to achieve its larger global goals. It was instrumental in creating the Mujahideen, a group of fighters originally formed to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan but who later evolved as the precursors to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Indeed, Mawdudi's message of a global Islamic revolution forms much of the ideological bedrock of al-Qaeda today.
Even in the midst of such a grave crisis, there is opportunity for Pakistan's politicians to roll back the Islamization of their society. If they fail to do so, however, the poison of sectarianism will consume the country, and it will almost certainly slide into the abyss of radical Islamic revolution. To avoid that fate, the state must extricate itself from the business of defining religious identity, sharia law must be repealed, and Pakistan's civil and military services must serve a secular political order, not the Jamat-e-Islami's vision of a global Islamic state. These reforms are not only desirable, but frankly necessary if freedom is to prevail in Pakistan.